Abstract-Web application firewall is an application firewall for HTTP applications. Typical WAF uses static analysis of HTTP request, defined as a set of rules, to find potentially dangerous payloads in the requests. Generally, these rules cover common attacks such as cross-site scripting (XSS) and SQL injection which are server-related attacks. Cross-site scripting is clientside attack however the server is attacked and forced to return malicious response. Rule-based approach becomes useless when the attack is client-related, for example employing malware on the banking site. Malware allows to change the transfer data. This scenario is hard to detect because the browser displays valid transfer data and data is changed to the thieves' accounts number at the communication stage.
I. INTRODUCTION
O NE OF the ideas to increase Web applications security was Web Application Firewall, a proxy server used to defend web apps against attacks usually employed in the application layer in contrary to classic firewalls. WAFs are located between classic firewall and the application server. Such architecture allows the firewall to mitigate attacks on lower layers and WAF to detect and mitigate attacks on application layer. Both groups of mentioned attacks can have similiar consequences such as Denial of Service. DoS attacks, well known from lower layers [7] , can also be performed on the application layer [5] . In [9] authors analyze 63 other articles about HTTP-GET flood attacks.
However, the application layer introduces a wide range of new threats to be detected and removed by WAF. OWASP Top Ten [10] is a powerful awareness document for web application security which represents a broad consensus about the most critical web application security flaws. The OWASP Top Ten list includes flaws, such as injections, cross-site scripting, cross-site request forgery, insecure session management, insecure direct object references, security misconfiguration, using components with known vulnerabilities and others. Most of web application firewalls focus on the technical attacks such as injections, cross-site scripting or cross-site request forgery while it is hard to detect other types such as insecure direct object references or business logic flaws because they are strictly application-dependent.
We are going to use request forgery attacks as an example of successful business attacks to present our new approach to detect and mitigate malicious requests. The most popular type of request forgery attacks are cross-site request forgery attack (CSRF) which makes a logged-on victim's browser send a forged HTTP request, together with the victim's session cookie and any other automatically attached authentication information to a vulnerable web application. In other words, the attacker forces the victim's browser to generate requests, which from the vulnerable application's perspective are legitimate. For this reason, on the server side we are not able to detect this only based on the technical attributes of the query. Although this is not a sophisticated attack, it indicates that the key players (Facebook, LinkedIn, etc.) had suffered from it.
Another type of request forgery attack is server-side request forgery (SSRF) and request forgery generated by malicious software. The SSRF differs from CSRF that the attacker forces a vulnerable application server to send a request. In the second type the attacker installs malicious software of victim's device which later sniffs the authentication data (eg. SMSes on the smartphone) and sends authenticated requests. According to reports by Symantec [11] and Kaspersky Lab [4] the malicious software is a significant problem with more than 30% of user computers subjected to at least one Malware-class attack and more than 170 mobile applications for credentials stealing in 2016. Unfortunatelly, the use of tokens as the factor, which authenticate the requests is not sufficient in the malicious environemnt. In this paper, we are focused on a popular case of request forgery attack performed by malicious software installed on clients device (eg. mobile phone) and propose a mechanism to detect such attacks. The current Web Application Firewalls assume that the clients' devices is free from malicious software. This assumption in times of common malware can not take place.
The major contributions of the presented results can be summarized as follows:
• We present a successful request forgery attack on the application defended by classic WAF when client has malware installed.
• We propose new architecture for protecting web applications against request forgery attacks performed by malicious software.
• We extend our WAF proposal to include Two-Factor Authorization mechanism and user's history analysis. The content of this paper is structured as follows. We discuss the related work in Section II. In section III we introduce the notation and describe the successful request forgery attacks leading to authorization bypass. Section IV describes our approach to detect and mitigate malicious business actions such as requests performed by malware. It includes the description of architecture, the detection algorithm. Finally, section V concludes this paper and describes the futher work.
II. RELATED WORK
In the literature method of protecting web applications are not widely discussed. Researchers focus on non-standard attacks that can not be detected on classic firewalls and design new mechanisms for detecting these specific attacks.
In [3] authors propose an automatic method of HTTP attacks signature generation. Their approach relies on the use of a service-specific, semantic-aware anomaly detection scheme that combines stochastic learning with a model structure based on the HTTP protocol specification. The proposed soluction assume that the clienct is free from malicious software.
The article [8] proposes an approach that uses ontology models to detect web application attacks in HTTP protocol. Authors created three models of correct request, correct response and an attack. The HTTP requests are analyzed for compliance with the model and marked as a potential attack when forbidden values are found. This approach is similar to the whitelist approach, which is time-consuming and leads to many false positive alarms.
The authors in article [6] concentrate on SQL injection attack and propose the detection mechanism employing graphs and Support Vector Machine. The algorithm converts SQL query to the graph and uses previously trained SVM to detect SQL injection. The drawback of this algorithm is that it focuses only on the detection of tautology which is the first phase of the attack. When the mechanism blocks such query it can be considered as the presence of vulnerability.
In [1] authors conducted a review of the literature on popular web application attacks from OWASP Top 10 list, such as injections, access control or session management. Among the analyzed mechanisms were source code static analysis, dynamic detection of forbidden values and more complex such as comparison of responses which dropped responses outlying from the norm. The most popular solutions were based on the detection of forbidden values and authors stated that there does not exist a solution that is capable of detecting all injections, even in only one category such as cross-site scripting, because of many special cases of such flaw. All the discussed protection mechanisms assume that the client is free from malicious software.
III. AUTHORIZATION BYPASSS WITH REQUEST FORGERY

ATTACKS
The aim of authorization bypass attacks is to perform an unauthorized action on behalf of authroized user. There exist many attack vectors and scenarios. In this section we describe four examples of such attacks, beginning with the simplest one employing social engineering techniques, to more complicated which uses malicious software.
A. Notation
We are going to use the following notation to describe the attack flows. The steps described correspond to the numbers in square brackets on matching figures.
• Actors:
-Client -the mobile or web client of the system, -W AF -web application firewall, -Server -system endpoint server (reverse proxy), -Attacker -an attacker (eg. malware).
• Messages: -CREDEN T IALS Client -Client's credentials, -SESS Client -Client's session created by Server, -EM AIL MAL -malicious e-mail message with malicious link, -REQ BA -a request to obtain form for business action BA, -RESP F ORM:BA -a response that contains the form of business action BA, -DAT A F ORM:BA -form data to performa a business action BA, -M ODDAT A F ORM:BA -modified (by malware) form data to performa a business action BA with malicious result, -RESP BA -a response that confirms the execution of business action BA, -RESP MODBA -a response that confirms the execution of modified business action BA, -CSRF T AG -a anti-CSRF tag, -2F A OT P -one time password from 2FA device, mandratory to authorize business action, -WAF sends challange to 2FA device for given business data for additional authorization, -AbortF orSecurityReason() -Client aborts operation (hacking attempt found).
B. The CSRF attack using a malware to bypass RSA Token and WAF In this example we present an attack which bypasses the RSA Token and Web Application Firewall with the use of financial Trojan like ZEUS. RSA Token is a two-factor authentication device which generate a cryptographically-secure token to authorize the business action. ZEUS malware, on the other hand, allows to change the bank transfer data in online banking system. The attack is hard to detect by user because the browser displays valid transfer data and data is changed to the thieves' account number during the communication. Twofactor authorization, which does not user a device that displays the decription of operation to be authorized, is not effective for this type of attack.
The case background is the following. The Client has a bank account in the bank which requires that the transactions commissioned on the online service must be confirmed using one time password (OTP) generated by RSA Token. Client's device is infected with malware that is specialized in stealing money from the bank transaction system (eg. ZEUS).
The scenario of the attack is presented on figure 1 . 
IV. THE NEW ARCHITECTURE FOR PROTECTING WEB APPLICATIONS AGAINST REQUEST FORGERY ATTACKS PERFORMED BY MALICIOUS SOFTWARE
In this section we describe our approach to extend WAF security with behavioral analysis. The solution we want to propose increases the security and usability of the application that the WAF protects. It reduces the risk of a successful attack, even if your device is infected with malware.
We introduce behavioral analysis and user action history. The user request is analyzed by WAF before it reaches the target system. The WAF analyzes whether the user has performed similar actions in the past and whether they have been successfully commissioned. The similarity is calculated on the base of technical and business attributes describing actions. When the requested action is similar, the WAF does not require additional authorization. If not, the WAF asks for additional authorization to confirm the operation for the data entered. It would speed up the use of the target system and minimize the risk that the user confirms the operation with input altered by the Attacker.
A. History analyze and the similarity function
The added value of our solution to the classic Web Application Firewall is the Hisotry Analyzer module. With this module we are able to detect potencial abuse using cross-site request forgery. The key element of the proposed solution is the similarity function. We are going to use the following model to describe the proposed solution. In order to implement historical analysis, we need to introduce a concept of action. Actions, ie, business orders that a user has performed on a system that protects the WAF. The module checks to see whether similar operations have been performed by the user in the past. Similarity is calculated using an algorithm 1. If the action is similar to past operations, additional authorization is not required. [5]{SESSClient}) [5] The Boolean set is a set of boolean values, the R -set represents real numbers and T ime is a set of all possible timestamps Definition 4. Actions and set of all possible actions. A = {a 1 , a 2 , ..., a n } a n = (T, B, V T, V B, Boolean, Boolean, T ime)
The A set is a set of all possible actions and the a n represents an action. This is a collection of all actions provided by a WAF-protected system with information about the actions taken by the user at a specific time along with the specific business effect. An action is defined by sets of technical and business attributes along with their values, two boolean values which states whether an action has been authorized with additional mechanisms and whether it has been allowed, and action's timestamp.
Definition 5. Function additionalAuthRequired
Function additionalAuthRequired returns whether additional authorization is required for given action. 
Function actionSimilarityT hreshold returns similarity threshold for given action based on its attributes. It is calculated as the maximum similarityThreshold for all possible subsets of action's values of attributes
The function similarity depends on the method to be used to compare actions. The algorithm of calculating the similarity of action is presented in Alg. 1. In this state of study we are using simply algorithm based on weighted wage. The values of the similarity function are taken later in the verification (additionalAuthRequired) that the action is similar enough to those previously performed that no further verification is needed.
Algorithm 1: Function that returns the similarity between the action and the history SIMILARITY (a i , A n ) inputs : Action and Action set output: Similarity factor tmpSum ← 0 tmpW age ← 0 foreach a j ∈ history(a i , A n ) do foreach attr i ∈ attrs(a j ) do if value(attr i , a i ) ≈ value(attr i , a j ) then tmpSum ← tmpSum + wage(attr i ) tmpW age ← tmpW age + wage(attr i ) if tmpW age = 0 then return 0;
return tmpSum ÷ tmpW age;
V. CONCLUSIONS
In the article we presented the weaknesses of Web Application Firewalls which use signature-based and rule-based static analysis. We presented a successful request forgery attack on the application defended by classic WAF when client has malware installed.
To protect against such attacks we introduced an approach, based on historical and behavioral analysis of user requests, which reduces the need for additional forms of authorization. After sufficiently collecting and analyzing user's history, the additional authorization appears only in the situation that actually requires it. Such approach increases the responsiveness and general feel of the application.
In the future work, we plan to implement the proposed system and check the efficiency and accuracy of it.
